



September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of a new era in American law.
Combating terrorism became a matter of great public urgency and as part of that
endeavor policies have been pursued that compromise once sacred principles of the
Constitution. These policies were initiated by President George W. Bush, but with
some exceptions, other branches of government soon endorsed them, and
remarkably, they are now being continued by President Barack Obama.
Although terrorism did not begin on 9/11, the attacks on that day were
distinguished by the magnitude of the death and destruction that they caused.
Those attacks also had the threatening quality of a foreign invasion. Important sites
in the United States-the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (and if the
terrorists had their way, the Capitol and White House would have been added to
the list)-were struck by foreign nationals acting on directions from abroad.
Moreover, the events of 9/11 became a public spectacle. Scenes of airplanes
crashing into the World Trade Center and the collapse of the towers were caught
on video and frequently replayed in later years. The messages conveyed and the
fears aroused by these images were further reinforced in the decade that followed
by bombings in London, Madrid, Amman, Mumbai, and Bali; attempts to blow up
two airplanes on their way to the United States; and the failed plot to detonate a car
full of explosives in Times Square. As a result, starting on September 11, 2001,
and continuing to this day, terrorism acquired an immediacy and reality for
Americans that it never had before.
The government's response to the attacks of 9/11-Bush's announcement of a
"War on Terror"-also endowed the events that occurred on that day with special
significance. This declaration of war was intended to mobilize the American
people and it had that effect. It prioritized the need to respond to the risk of
terrorism and prepared the public for the sacrifices that such a response would
entail. In that respect, Bush was following the practice of earlier presidents who
had declared a "War on Poverty," a "War on Drugs," and even a "War on Cancer,"
but there was one important difference-Bush soon employed the military to
achieve his objectives.
In the fall of 2001, Bush determined that Al Qaeda, a far-flung organization
that operates in secret, was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. He then began what
can properly be regarded as a war against Al Qaeda. He unleashed the military
force of the United States and charged it with the task of capturing or targeting
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Osama Bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda. At the same time, Bush ordered
the invasion of Afghanistan, then controlled by the Taliban, on the theory that a
symbiotic relationship existed between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In March 2003,
the president broadened the United States military operations in the Middle East
and invaded Iraq, then controlled by Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party.
Although the 9/11 terrorist attacks were not the basis of that military endeavor,
terrorism, sometimes at the hands of Al Qaeda, was a consequence of the invasion
of Iraq and the occupation that inevitably followed.
In his war against terrorism, Bush instituted a number of practices that
violated principles long viewed as hallmarks of our constitutional tradition. One
such principle is the prohibition against torture. This prohibition is not only rooted
in an international treaty and a federal statute implementing that treaty, but also in
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the Bill of Rights. Soon after 9/11, however,
the White House turned to lawyers within the executive branch for legal opinions
that narrowed the definition of torture to allow the use of interrogation techniques
such as waterboarding-to induce the fear of imminent death by drowning-that
are almost universally condemned as torture.
During this same time, suspects were secretly sent to other countries, such as
Syria and Egypt, that routinely torture their prisoners and subject them to abuses
that would qualify as torture even under the Bush administration's narrow
definition. This practice, known as extraordinary rendition, and more properly seen
as a form of outsourcing,' is as much a violation of the rule against torture as when
officials of the United States engage in torture themselves.
Bush also instituted a detention policy that threatened another principle of our
constitutional order-what I have elsewhere called the principle of freedom.2 This
principle prohibits the executive from incarcerating anyone without charging that
individual with a crime and swiftly bringing him to trial. There are exceptions to
this principle, including one for war. Under this exception, the executive is allowed
to detain enemy combatants captured on the battlefield and hold them for the
duration of hostilities. Bush invoked this exception and then construed it in a way
that threatened to undermine the very values that the principle of freedom seeks to
protect.
Bush did not confine himself to imprisoning persons seized in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or even the mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Rather, he treated the entire world as if it were a battlefield, even to the point of
seizing persons within the United States, including American citizens, and treating
them as enemy combatants. Bush also refused to place any temporal limits on this
policy of imprisonment without trial and was prepared to incarcerate persons for
prolonged, indefinite periods of time-maybe for life. Although he said he would
1 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary
Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 106-23, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fafact6.
2 Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OxFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 235-36 (2006).
1086 [No. 4
ABERRATIONS No MORE
hold these individuals only until the end of the War on Terror or, more modestly,
until the end of the war against Al Qaeda, the end of this war is not readily
foreseeable. Even if Osama Bin Laden were captured, new leadership is likely to
emerge, and in any event, the many cells of Al Qaeda are capable of acting on their
own. Extending the exception to the principle of freedom for wartime captures to a
never ending war of this sort threatens to undermine the principle itself.
All of the prisoners subject to Bush's detention policy were held
incommunicado, but sometimes a friend or relative, or even a volunteer lawyer,
discovered a prisoner's whereabouts and filed a petition of habeas corpus on his
behalf. These petitions claimed that the prisoner was not in fact an enemy
combatant, and thus there was no legal authority for the executive to detain him,
even under the rule allowing wartime captures. Nevertheless, the Bush
administration resisted any factual inquiry by the judiciary into the merits of these
claims.
For prisoners who were American citizens, and thus held in prisons within the
United States, the government sought to limit the evidentiary inquiry by the federal
judiciary.3 The government insisted that an affidavit filed by an official in the
Department of Defense explaining the basis for the incarceration should be
accepted at face value and treated as sufficient for detaining the prisoners. The
government maintained that there could be no judicial probe into the adequacy of
the affidavit and no opportunity for the prisoner to offer evidence to substantiate
his claim that he was not an enemy combatant.
For foreign nationals being held abroad, including those at Guantinamo, the
government took the position that these prisoners had no right to habeas corpus
whatsoever.4 According to the government, foreign nationals held abroad had no
constitutional rights, including the right to personal freedom, and thus the writ of
habeas corpus served no function.
Although the Bush administration claimed that it had the right to hold anyone
it classified as unlawful enemy combatants for prolonged, indefinite periods, it also
claimed the right to place some on trial for their actions on behalf of Al Qaeda or
the Taliban. Some of these individuals were to be tried in ordinary civilian courts.
One, an American citizen named John Walker Lindh, who had been captured in
Afghanistan and acknowledged that he had fought for the Taliban, was charged in
federal court and accused under federal criminal statutes of attempting to kill
American personnel.' The administration also used civilian courts to indict or try a
number of persons accused of being agents of Al Qaeda who had been arrested and
imprisoned in the United States. One was an American citizen seized at O'Hare
airport in Chicago and another was a citizen of Qatar who had been studying in the
United States.6 Bush did not, however, limit himself to the use of civilian courts. In
3 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572, 605-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
4 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
5 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002).
6 See United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE, 2006 WL 3678567 (S.D.
Fla. 2006); Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004).
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November 2001, he issued an Executive Order authorizing the use of military
commissions to try terrorists.7 By 2005, the administration determined that twenty
detainees being held in Guantinamo were to be tried by military commissions
established pursuant to the president's Executive Order.
In the midst of an ongoing conflict, military commissions have been convened
on the battlefield and used to try enemy soldiers accused of war crimes. Now and
then, we departed from this tradition; for example, in World War II a military
commission was used, with the reluctant approval of the Supreme Court, to try
Nazi soldiers who had entered the country for purposes of sabotage.8 Bush's
decision to use military commissions in Guantinamo built on this precedent and
ignored the intervening advances in our understanding of due process that occurred
during the Warren Court era. Bush's plan also vastly expanded the jurisdiction of
military commissions. It contemplated using military commissions to try a group
of prisoners that had been incarcerated for years at Guantinamo, far from any
battlefield. And it did not limit the commissions to trying offenses that were
proscribed by the laws of war. In this way, Bush had effectively transformed the
military commission from a tribunal of necessity to one of convenience, giving the
prosecution advantages that are anathema to the constitutional dictates of due
process.
Under Bush's scheme, trials of Guantinamo prisoners were to be carried out
by military officers subject to supervision by an official in the Department of
Defense.9 The rules of evidence permitted the introduction of a wider range of
hearsay evidence than would be allowed in federal court. Any evidence that had
probative value was admissible. There were no protections against the use of
confessions obtained by coercion or even torture. The accused could be convicted
on the basis of evidence that neither he nor his counsel saw or heard. The
accused's choice of counsel also was strictly circumscribed. In addition, Bush's
commissions compromised the accused's right to trial by jury and the right to a
speedy and public trial.
In conducting his War on Terror, Bush also showed little respect for the
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy. In the immediate wake of 9/11, he
authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to tap telephones without prior
judicial authorization.o These taps were aimed at international telephone calls
between persons in America and individuals abroad suspected of having ties to Al
Qaeda. In 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled that wiretapping was the functional
equivalent of a search, and thus subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, it reserved the question of whether such a rule would extend to
7 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted in 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
$Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
9 Military Order of November 13, sec. 4.
0 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE




national security cases.'" The case before the Court involved telephone calls of a
suspected gambler.12 In 1972, the Supreme Court extended the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to a prosecution involving the bombing of a
C.I.A. building in Ann Arbor, Michigan.' 3 In that case, the Supreme Court once
again reserved the question of whether the warrant requirement should apply to
wiretaps aimed at obtaining foreign intelligence. 14
Unprepared to wait for further clarification by the Supreme Court, in 1978
Congress passed a statute-the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)-that
required warrants for wiretaps seeking foreign intelligence and established a new
tribunal with streamlined procedures for obtaining such warrants." These warrants
were to be issued by a tribunal that operated in secret and whose judges were
appointed by the chief justice.' 6 Bush's NSA wiretapping program violated the
very terms of the 1978 statute and, even more fundamentally, the constitutional
principles that it sought to further. The warrant requirement creates a check on
arbitrary executive action and, to that end, protects the Fourth Amendment's right
of private communication so essential to the development of the human personality
and political freedom.
Some have depicted the five practices that I have identified-interrogation
under torture, imprisonment without trial, denial of habeas corpus, unfettered use
of military commissions, and warrantless wiretapping-as entirely the work of
Bush and his close circle of advisors. So characterized, these practices have been
denounced as excesses of Bush's unilateralism and a violation of separation of
powers, which at least from one reading, requires collaboration among the three
branches of government. There is an element of truth to this charge-in conducting
his War on Terror, Bush made extravagant claims about the power of the
presidency-but such a charge should not obscure a deeper and more fundamental
truth: although the president led the way, the other branches were complicit in this
assault on the Constitution. At issue, therefore, was not simply -separation of
powers, but rather the constitutional principles prohibiting torture, protecting
personal freedom, assuring fair procedures, and guaranteeing privacy.
In December 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act.' 7 One part
of that statute, spearheaded by Senator John McCain, prohibits American officials
from inflicting torture wherever they might act and against whomever they act.18
Bush fiercely resisted this measure as it made its way through Congress, and when
he eventually signed the bill he issued one of his most notorious signing
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).
12 Id. at 348.
13 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317-21 (1972).
14 Id. at 309.
15 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783.
16 Id. § 103.
17 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).
8 Id. § 1006(a)(1).
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statements.19 In it, Bush called attention to the fact that the McCain measure
provided no remedy for the enforcement of the ban on torture. The president also
said that he was signing the bill into law with the understanding that he would not
allow it to compromise his duties as commander in chief.
This assertion of his power as commander in chief was an affront to the
constitutional allocation of power, which grants Congress authority to share in the
regulation of the activities of the armed forces.2 0 Even more striking, Bush's
assertion of power gave no recognition to the fact that the McCain measure was
only a codification of the ban on torture rooted in the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments, which most assuredly limit the president's power as commander in
chief. Bush's signing statement not only disputed the power of Congress, but also
the constitutional tradition that subordinates all executive action, even the exercise
of an enumerated power, to the Bill of Rights.
The other provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 posed no such
confrontation with the president. Rather, the Act affirmed Bush's program of
executive detention. The Act specifically denied the writ of habeas corpus to all the
prisoners at Guantinamo.2 1 It also acknowledged, and thus approved, the system of
military tribunals-the so-called Combatant Status Review Tribunals-established
on the island in July 2004, more than two years after the prison was opened, to
hear claims of prisoners who denied any connection to Al Qaeda or the Taliban or
any other terrorist organization. 22 These tribunals were staffed by military officers
operating under the most lax evidentiary rules, and there was no provision for legal
representation of the prisoners. Review of the decisions of the Status Review
Tribunals was confined to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
the grounds available to it for review were restricted.23 The factual basis for a
Status Review Tribunal's decision could not be questioned in any way.
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 also reaffirmed Bush's policies. 24 It
expanded the 2005 ban on the writ of habeas corpus, by extending the ban to all
unlawful enemy combatants, regardless of where they might be held, and by
making it clear that the ban was applicable to all pending cases. 2 5 In addition, the
'9 Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?%20pid=65259 (declaring that "[t]he
Executive branch shall construe" the prohibition "in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President . . . to supervise the unitary executive branch and
as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial
power" in order to "protect[] the American people from further terrorist attacks").
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 11-15.
21 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(1).
22 Id. § 1005(e)(2).
23 Id.
24 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, § 948b(a), 120
Stat. 2600, 2602.
25 Id. § 7.
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2006 Act authorized the president to use military commissions to try so-called
unlawful enemy combatants and thus endorsed the position Bush had taken in his
November 2001 Executive Order. 26 Admittedly, some of the procedures originally
contemplated by Bush when he issued his Executive Order were disallowed by
Congress. Congress gave the accused the right to hear the evidence against him
and limitations were placed on the use of confessions obtained through torture.27
Congress also required that the accused had to be notified in advance that hearsay
was to be used.28 Still, the essential due process defects of military commissions
remained-trial by military officers, supervision .by a political appointee,
permissive evidentiary rules, no right to a jury trial, and no right to a speedy or
public trial. Moreover, like Bush's initial Executive Order, the 2006 Act allowed
the trial for offenses, such as giving material support to a belligerent, that were not
proscribed by the laws of war.29 And, as was true of the Executive Order, the 2006
Act confined the use of military commissions to the trial of foreign nationals,
which not only raised questions of equal protection, but also testified to the
second-class character of the justice the commissions were likely to render-it was
not good enough for Americans.
Congress also gave the president the authority to conduct wiretaps without
court authorization.30 Although the NSA warrantless wiretap program was
authorized by Bush immediately following the 9/11 attacks, it was not publicly
disclosed until December 2005. In the period immediately following that
disclosure, many complained that the NSA program violated the warrant
requirement established in 1978 under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The attorney general insisted otherwise but, even more audaciously, claimed that
the president's action was within his powers as commander in chief and thus could
not be limited by Congress.
In January 2007, the attorney general announced that the president was
voluntarily, as a matter of policy, abandoning the NSA program.32 However, in
August 2007, Congress passed legislation-the Protect America Act-that allowed
the executive to wiretap, without warrants, telephone calls abroad to persons
suspected of Al Qaeda ties. 33 In 2008, another statute-known as the FISA




30 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 201, § 802, 122 Stat. 2436, 2468-70
(to be codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
31 See Alberto Gonzales, Prepared Statement of Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney
General of the United States (Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2006/agspeech 060206.html.
32 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to Senators Patrick Leahy and
Arlen Specter, Chairmen of the Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 17, 2007), available at
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdflpolitics/20060117gonzalesLetter.pdf.
3 Protect America Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 552.
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Amendments Act of 2008-was enacted that extended the authorization of the
2007 Act for warrantless wiretaps.34 The 2008 Act also protected the telephone
carriers who had participated in the NSA program from any liability for their
wrongdoing.
In each of these measures-the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military
Commission Act of 2006, and the authorization for warrantless wiretaps of the
2007 and 2008 Acts-Congress endorsed a number of Bush's counterterrorism
policies that offended the Constitution. The Supreme Court's endorsement was
more oblique and harder to discern, but nevertheless a reality and deeply
disturbing. Even when the government was rebuffed, the defense of the
Constitution was weak and compromised.
In a June 2004 ruling involving an American citizen who had allegedly fought
for the Taliban, the Supreme Court held as a matter of due process that the prisoner
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he had not taken up arms
against the United States. This victory was compromised, however, when Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, fashioned the particular procedural rules to
govern these hearings.37 She further compromised her stance on due process when
she declared-now only for four justices-that the required evidentiary hearing
need not be held before federal courts sitting in habeas, but instead could be
conducted by a properly constituted military tribunal.3 8 Indeed, it was this
pronouncement that guided the Department of Defense, anxious to defeat any
claims to habeas, to establish the Combatant Status Review Tribunals on
Guantinamo in July 2004, only a month after the Court's ruling. If a military
tribunal is good enough to determine whether an American had taken up arms
against the United States, the secretary of defense must have reasoned, it certainly
is good enough for foreign nationals.
In a companion case also involving an American citizen-this time seized in
Chicago, transferred to New York, and then held in a Naval brig in South Carolina
as an enemy combatant-the Supreme Court refused to pass on the merits of his
habeas petition.39 The opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who,
clinging to the most arcane technicality, said that the prisoner should have filed his
petition in the South Carolina, rather than the New York, federal district court.40
This ruling was handed down in June 2004, almost three years after the War on
Terror had begun and after the prisoner had been held incommunicado for more
than two years. Subsequently, the prisoner filed a habeas petition in the South
Carolina district court and that court soon granted it.4 1 However, that decision was
34 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. at 2468-70.
3 1 d. § 101(a)(2).
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
37 Id. at 324-39.
38 Id. at 338-39.
3 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).40 Id. at 442-47.
41 Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005).
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reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.42 The
prisoner then sought review by the Supreme Court, but when the moment came to
respond to the prisoner's application for certiorari, and in an obvious attempt to
avoid Supreme Court review of its policy of imprisonment without trial, the Bush
administration reversed course and charged the prisoner with a crime in a Florida
district court. On April 3, 2006, the Supreme Court failed to confront this
transparently evasive strategy and denied the prisoner's application for certiorari.43
The Court's policy of avoidance also governed its treatment of the
Guantinamo prisoners' attempts to obtain habeas corpus. Prior to reaching the
Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
embraced the administration's position and denied the Guantinamo prisoners the
writ on the ground that they had no constitutional rights. As the court of appeals
said, "[w]e cannot see why, or how, the writ may be made available to aliens
abroad when basic constitutional protections are not."" However, rather than
address this ruling in any direct way, the Supreme Court in a June 2004 ruling held
that under the very terms of the statute, habeas was available to Guantinamo
prisoners as long as the jailor (in this instance the secretary of defense) was within
the jurisdiction of the habeas court.4 5
Congress responded to this interpretation of the habeas statute by enacting the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In it, Congress amended the habeas statute to
deny the writ to the Guantinamo prisoners and make the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals their exclusive remedy.46 The legality of this feature of the statute was
before the Supreme Court in June 2006, but the Court once again avoided deciding
whether the Guantinamo prisoners had a right to habeas corpus that was protected
by the Constitution. Rather, the Court held, through a strained interpretation, that
the ban on habeas of the 2005 statute did not apply to a case such as the one then
before it, which had been pending at the time of enactment.47
In October 2006, as part of the Military Commissions Act, Congress once
again amended the habeas statute. It made the ban on habeas applicable to all
persons held as unlawful enemy combatants, regardless of where they might be
held, and also made it abundantly clear that the ban was applicable to all pending
cases "without exception."48 In reviewing this measure in a case arising from
Guantinamo, the court of appeals acknowledged the applicability of the ban on
habeas to the case before it, even though it had been pending at the time of
enactment. The court went on to uphold the ban, once again denying that the
Guantinamo prisoners had any constitutional rights that might be protected by the
42 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005).
43 Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
" Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
45 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-85 (2004).
46 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680,
2740-44 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).
4 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572-84 (2006).




writ.4 9 In June 2008, the Supreme Court finally held-more than six years after the
prison opened-that the Guantinamo prisoners were entitled, as a constitutional
matter, to have their imprisonment reviewed by a writ of habeas corpus. But the
majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, failed to address the view of the
court of appeals that denied the protection of the Bill of Rights to foreign nationals
being held abroad.
In this decision, styled Boumediene v. Bush,50 Justice Kennedy depicted the
provision of the Constitution protecting the writ of habeas corpus as an instrument
of separation of powers.5 ' He saw separation of powers as furthering freedom in
general, but on his account, freedom was only a residue.52 Freedom was not a right
directly conferred on the Guantinamo prisoners by the Constitution or Bill of
Rights, but rather was derived from any habeas court decision holding that a
prisoner was not an enemy combatant and thus could not be lawfully imprisoned
by the executive.5 1 Justice Kennedy most emphatically did not declare that the
Guantinamo prisoners enjoyed the protection of the Bill of Rights-protections
that might enable a Guantinamo prisoner determined in a habeas proceeding to be
an enemy combatant to challenge prolonged detention without trial or the use of
military commissions to try him for whatever he had done in the war, or to protect
against the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques (torture).
Remarkably, all of that was left for yet another day.
The limitations of the Boumediene decision were also evident in the test
Kennedy announced for determining when habeas would be available. He did not
hold, as he might have, that the writ must be available whenever or wherever a
prisoner is held in a secure detention facility by an American official, but rather
made his decision turn on a multivariate test. According to Kennedy, the
availability of the writ depended on (1) the citizenship of the prisoner, (2) the
prisoner's status, (3) the adequacy of the process through which his status was
determined, (4) the nature of the site of apprehension, (5) the nature of the site of
detention, and (6) the practical difficulties in resolving the prisoner's claim of
freedom.54 Of course, we have become accustomed in the law to multivariate tests,
but usually, as with the famed Matthews v. Eldridge" test, the numbered factors
are meant to pursue or serve a single unifying principle. Some factors identified in
Boumediene, by contrast, bore little relationship to the separation of powers
principle that was allegedly the foundation of the decision. As a result, no one
could tell how the test might apply to other detention facilities abroad, such as the
one maintained by the United States at the Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan,
which was also used to detain suspected terrorists and, at the time, held close to six
hundred prisoners.
49 Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
so Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
5' Id. at 764-66.
52 Id. at 796-98.
531 d. at 753-71.
Id. at 766.
5'424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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On November 4, 2008, only months after the Boumediene decision, Barack
Obama was elected president of the United States. This was a transcendent
moment in the history of a nation founded on slavery. There was also reason to
believe that Obama might repudiate many of the Bush policies that offended the
Constitution. Obama had campaigned on a platform that promised change, and
many understood that promise to reach Bush's counterterrorism policies. Obama
gave further credence to this belief when, in his inaugural address, he rejected the
notion that the fight against terrorism required us to betray our ideals. For the most
part, however, Obama has not been true to this promise. Although he withdrew the
last combat troops from Iraq in August 2010.and has been meticulous in avoiding
the use of the phrase "War on Terror," Obama has frequently declared that we are
at war with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and in the name of these wars, has
continued many of the unconstitutional policies of Bush.
As his first order of business, Obama issued an Executive Order banning
torture. 6 He thus reaffirmed the constitutional principle codified by McCain's
addition to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and removed the doubt created by
the statement Bush had made on signing that Act. Obama also minimized the risk
of torture by issuing orders that same day closing the secret prisons maintained
abroad by the CIA-the so-called black sites 57-and requiring the CIA to follow
the Army Field Manual when interrogating suspects.
Yet we must take account of the fact that Obama quickly brushed aside calls
for criminal prosecutions and truth commissions to investigate the abusive
interrogation practices of the previous administration. After a public outcry, his
attorney general opened an investigation on a CIA interrogator accused of going
beyond agency guidelines. 59 The alleged crime was not waterboarding, which
appears to have been authorized by higher officials-perhaps, if his memoir is to
be believed, by Bush himself. Rather, the agent was accused of threatening a
hooded and shackled prisoner with imminent death first by revving an electric drill
near the prisoner's head and then by cocking a semi-automatic handgun in the
same position. The investigation of this rogue agent was opened in August 2009
and we still do not know what might come of it. For the most part, the president
has insisted, even with as gross an offense as torture, that he is interested in the
future, not the past, without understanding that how one treats the past partly
determines what will happen in the future.
Obama can also be faulted for not disavowing the practice of extraordinary
rendition with any clarity. In fact, on two notable instances, one in the Ninth
Circuit and the other in the Second Circuit, the Obama administration sought to
block judicial inquiries into renditions conducted by the Bush administration.
These proceedings were brought by victims of rendition and were pending before
56 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
5 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
58 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4,894.





appellate courts when Obama took office. In one, Obama's lawyers relied on the
state secrets doctrine, transforming what was originally an evidentiary privilege
into a de facto grant of immunity to the CIA.o In the other, his lawyers claimed
that any judicial inquiry into the practice of extraordinary rendition would
compromise the executive's authority over military and foreign affairs.6
In contrast to Bush, Obama has been reluctant to treat the United States as
part of the battleground against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Accordingly, he placed
within the ambit of the criminal justice system two terrorist suspects who were
seized in the United States on his watch. One was an American citizen attempting
to detonate a bomb in Times Square6 2 and the other a citizen of Nigeria attempting
to detonate a bomb on a Northwest Airlines flight as it was about to land in
Detroit. 63 Yet, Obama invoked the war exception to the principle of freedom as the
basis for continuing the imprisonment without trial of prisoners being held in
Guantinamo and at the Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan. Bush had claimed
this power as commander in chief. Anxious to avoid the unilateralism of Bush,
Obama did not invoke his authority as commander in chief to justify this policy,
but instead relied on the statute passed by Congress immediately after 9/11, which
did no more than authorize the president to use force in responding to the terrorist
attacks on that day.
Although on occasion Bush tried Al Qaeda suspects in civilian courts, he also
claimed the authority to try some before military commissions and did so without
announcing the criteria to govern the choice between tribunals. Obama claims the
same authority. Obama made headlines when he first announced that he would try
the alleged mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, in the Southern District
Court of New York,64 but the controversy that erupted over this announcement
should not blind us to the fact that Obama is prepared to try some of the
Guantdnamo prisoners before military commissions and now is in the process of
doing so. Like Bush, Obama has failed to announce any meaningful criteria
governing this choice of tribunal.
As a senator,, Obama voted against the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
which not only barred habeas corpus, but also authorized the use of military
60 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
61 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-78 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
62 Benjamin Weiser & Colin Moynihan, Guilty Plea in Times Square Bomb Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22terror.html.
63 Charlie Savage, Nigerian Indicted in Terrorist Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at
A14; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Indicted for
Attempted Bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas Day (Jan. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/I 0-nsd-004.html.
6 See, e.g., Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (Statement of Attorney Gen. Eric Holder); see also Charlie




commissions to try foreign nationals being held as unlawful enemy combatants.6 5
As president, Obama sponsored the Military Commissions Act of 2009.66
Admittedly, the principal purpose of this legislation was to strengthen the
evidentiary rules governing military commissions. Under the Act, all coerced
testimony was barred, the accused was given a reasonable opportunity to obtain
evidence and witnesses, the government's obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence was expanded, and the accused was given the right to examine any
evidence offered at trial. Moreover, the political officer convening a military
commission was prohibited from punishing members of the commission for any of
their rulings.
Still, the basic structural shortcoming of the commission-trial by military
officers-persists. Indeed, the 2009 Act, building on Bush's initial Executive
Order of November 2001 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, represents a
further institutionalization of military commissions as an irregular alternative the
executive might choose-on criteria we will never know-for the prosecution of
unlawful, or now, unprivileged enemy combatants. Much like the 2006 Act and
Bush's November 2001 Executive Order, the 2009 Act defined the offenses that
could be tried before a commission to include crimes, such as giving material aid
to a belligerent, that could not properly be considered crimes under the laws of
war. 6 The irregular nature of these military commissions was underscored by a
provision in the 2009 Act, also present in the 2006 Act and the 2001 Executive
Order, confining them to the trial of foreign nationals.
Obama has sought to follow through on his promise to close Guantdnamo, and
in December 2009, announced his plan to transfer the remaining Guantinamo
prisoners to a prison in Thomson, Illinois. This plan has encountered congressional
resistance and has not yet been implemented. It should be emphasized, however,
that once Obama decided, as he did in May 2009, to continue the practice of using
military commissions for the trial of some of the Guantinamo prisoners and to
continue the policy of holding other Guantinamo prisoners for prolonged,
indefinite detention without trial, the closure of Guantinamo has become a gesture
of doubtful significance. Guantinamo became an object of public controversy and
disapprobation, not just because it was viewed as a site where prisoners were
tortured, but also because Bush had planned to use military commissions to try
some of the prisoners being held there and to continue the imprisonment of others
being held there without affording them a trial of any type.
The notoriety of Guantinamo had also arisen because Bush insisted that it lay
beyond the reach of habeas corpus. It had become something of a legal black
hole.68 The June 2008 Boumediene decision relieved Obama of the need to take a
65 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600,
2600.
66 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
§ 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574 (2009).
67 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.




position on the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to the Guantinamo
prisoners-the Supreme Court rejected Bush's position 69 -but Obama has tried to
limit the scope of that ruling, and in so doing, further denied the act of closing
Guantinamo of much of its meaning. Obama's lawyers have argued in open court
that the Boumediene decision should be confined to Guantinamo alone and that the
prison at Bagram-to which terrorism suspects from the four corners of the earth
had been brought-was beyond the reach of the Constitution.
The district court applied the Boumediene criteria to Bagram and found that
habeas is available to prisoners who were not Afghanistan citizens. 70 However, the
court of appeals, also applying the Boumediene criteria, reversed this decision and
denied habeas to any of the Bagram prisoners.7 ' Now the petitioners are, with the
blessing of the court of appeals, 72 back in the district court claiming that they have
new evidence that would be relevant to the application of the Boumediene criteria,
and further suggesting that the executive had used Bagram as a strategy for
defeating any claims of habeas corpus or arguably, as the court of appeals put it,
for "turn[ing] off the Constitution."73 Such protracted litigation is not at all
surprising, given the multivariate test Justice Kennedy laid down in Boumediene,
but what is remarkable and disturbing is that today Obama denies that habeas is
available for the prisoners of Bagram, just as Bush had for the Guantdnamo
prisoners.
Finally, we must account for Obama's position on the warrantless wiretaps
that began during the Bush era. Bush claimed the authority to institute such
surveillance as an incident of his power as commander in chief and insisted that as
such, he was free to disregard the obligation to obtain a warrant imposed by FISA.
Obama does not claim such executive prerogatives, nor need he. In the Protect
America Act of 2007,74 the president was authorized by Congress to engage in
such eavesdropping, and this authorization was extended in the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008.75As a senator, Obama voted against the 2007 Act. He fought the grant
of immunity to the carriers eventually contained in the 2008 Act, but in the end,
abstained from the vote on that measure. Since assuming office, Obama's attorney
general has indicated that he will vigorously defend the 2008 Act's
constitutionality.
We must of course be careful to note the differences between Bush and
Obama, and yet the essential truth is one of continuity. Obama has not disavowed
extraordinary rendition and has, in fact, sought to block judicial inquiries into that
practice. Obama has continued the policy of imprisonment without trial. Obama
69 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
70 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231-32 (D.D.C. 2009).
7n Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
72 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010).
7 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). The proceedings are
ongoing as of the time this lecture was delivered on October 26, 2010.
74 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.
7s FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 201, § 802, 122 Stat.
2436, 2468-70 (to be codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
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has sought to deny the writ of habeas corpus to the prisoners now being held in
Bagram. Obama has continued to use military commissions to try terrorist
suspects. And Obama has continued the policy of warrantless wiretaps. Obama
sometimes announced these policies with reluctance, which was never Bush's
style, but in the end, Obama overcame this reluctance and chose to sacrifice
principle.
The reasons for Obama's perpetuation of Bush's policies are hard to fathom.
Maybe Obama learned things about the nature of the terrorist threat that he did not
know before. Maybe Obama compromised on these issues of principle in order to
gain support for a number of his other policies-healthcare or economic
recovery-all most worthy. Or maybe Obama has been unable to resist the
momentum achieved by the Bush policies now that they have been endorsed by
Congress and tolerated by the Supreme Court. I just do not know and we are likely
never to know. Our concern should be, however, not with the reasons for Obama's
actions, but rather with the consequences of his action, which are unmistakable and
troubling.
At the beginning of the decade and in the immediate wake of 9/11, many of
the abuses of the Constitution that I have identified were seen as aberrations,
perhaps unilateral excesses of Bush and his close circle of advisors. Soon these
practices received the endorsement of Congress and often the acquiescence of the
Supreme Court. Now they have been endorsed by the new president, a lawyer who
professes to be dedicated to the Constitution and the highest ideals of the nation.
As a result, the transgressions of the Bush era, rather than being denounced as
unworthy of our Constitution, have been institutionalized. They have become the
official policies of our government and are routinely defended as constitutional.
Not only must we today suffer these transgressions, but they will inevitably
determine what is permissible in the future. They have shaped our understanding
of what is acceptable, and may well serve as precedents for a less reluctant
president.
Continued in this way, unconstitutional policies first initiated by Bush in the
War on Terror have taken on a life of their own and have become durable features
of our legal order. As such, they betray the proudest ideals of the nation,
undermine one of the pillars of our self-understanding, and deny us-all of us,
including Obama-the right to speak of the example of America as we once did-
as a beacon for all the world.
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